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ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY: SYMBIOSIS OF CIVILIZATIONS 
 
The tragic events in our post 9/11 world disguise the fact that Islam and the West 
have actually been in a symbiotic relationship for more than a millennium. The 
identification of Islam with terrorism is not only a very recent development, it is also 
vastly misleading and lop-sided. So much so that the Italian Minister Roberto 
Calderoli declared some time ago that Islam was not even a civilization. Nothing can 
be further than the truth. 
 
Muslims played a crucial role in the development of Western civilization. Within the 
first 20 years of the revelation of Islam, Arabs conquered Roman/Byzantine Egypt 
and Syria, thus establishing contact with the wisdom of ancient Greece, Egypt and 
Mesopotamia. Conquest of Iran and Islamization of Northern India followed. Soon 
the first translations were made from Greek, Arameic, Sanskrit and Persian into 
Arabic. What the Greeks lacked, like the concept of zero and trigonometry, were 
provided by the Indians. By the ninth century, borrowing reached to a new threshold 
and Muslims began their own contributions in astronomy, geography, mathematics 
and sciences. A dramatic example is provided by Caliph al-Me’mun, who established 
a famous academy in Bagdad in early 9th century. The scholars of this academy 
discovered that the earth was round. When informed about this, the Caliph 
commissioned the scholars to calculate the length of the equator. The result they 
reached was ca. 40.000 kms. Modern science has not been able to improve this result. 
Comparative historians of science now argue that western science is a continuation of 
Islamic science, which itself was a continuation of the Greek sciences. The Greek 
sciences, on the other hand, evolved from Babylonia and Egypt.1 In short, we live in a 
world of continuum and civilizations learn from each other.  
 
I am not a historian of science, but my predecessor Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, the 
                                                 
1 F. SEZGIN, Kim Demis Islam Buyuk Bir Medeniyet Degil Diye, in “Zaman”, July 29th, 2005. See particulary his, 




first Allianz-Gast Professur, was. So I do not want to repeat here the things that he 
must have explained already. Instead, I want to focus on the contribution of Islam to 
the West as a historian and a social scientist. 
 
The relationship between Islam and capitalism has long fascinated social scientists. 
There is strong evidence that Islam had developed its own capitalism. Consider for 
instance that bulk of the Sharia, Islamic jurisprudence, was written down by men 
most of whom were merchants. More importantly, even Prophet Mohammed 
himself was a merchant, who firmly believed in free markets and refused to 
interfere in prices. Moreover, of the four righteous Caliphs, Abu Bakr was a cloth 
merchant and Uthman was an importer of cereals.2 Great Islamic philosophers also 
had firm opinions about property. For instance, the famous twelfth century 
philosopher Al-Ghazali considers the protection of property (hifz al-mal) as one of 
the five purposes of Islamic jurisprudence (Maqasid al-Shariat). The great 
fourteenth century historian and philosopher Ibn Khaldun had highly sophisticated 
ideas about economics and, reflecting the Prophet, favoured minimum state 
interference in the economy.3 Therefore, there is nothing surprising about the fact 
that Islam, a religion born in the Arabian dessert, where trade constitutes the most 
important, may be even the sole economic activity, favours merchants, property 
rights, free trade and market economy. My own conclusion is that Muslims had 
discovered capitalism centuries before Adam Smith and that there was a highly 
successful Islamic capitalism. Because an economic system that favours merchants, 
property rights, free trade and market economy is generally known as capitalist, I 
have no qualms about calling this Islamic economic system as such even though 
this term is so closely associated with the Western experience.4  
                                                 
2  S. D. Goitein, “The Rise of the Middle-Eastern Bourgeoise in Early Islamic Times” in S. D. Goitein, Studies in 
Islamic History and Institutions (Leiden: Brill, 1968): 223. 
3 Umar Chapra, The Future of Economics, An Islamic Perspective (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 2000), pp. 58, 
146-177. 
4  For a very detailed and rigorous discussion on whether the Islamic economic system can be called capitalistic see; 
Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism (New York: Penguin Books, 1974). Rodinson first approaches the problem 
from Marxist perspective and declines to call Islamic economic system capitalist but then admits that it possessed a 
highly sophisticated “capitalist sector”. He also admits that “the merchants of the Muslim Empire conformed 
perfectly well to Max Weber’s criteria for capitalistic activity”, ibid., pp. 28-30.  
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Characteristics of Islamic Capitalism: 
 
Islamic capitalism prohibited usury and firmly protected property rights. It also 
allowed and encouraged free trade, legitimate profit and capital accumulation. But 
at the same time it also warned wealthy Muslims that they would have to answer 
the following questions in the day of judgement: 
1. How did you earn your capital? 
2. And how did you spend it? 
 
Thus, providing wealth is earned through legitimate means and providing it is spent 
for one’s family’s needs and for the good of the society, Islamic jurisprudence does 
not impose any limit to the capital a Muslim can accumulate. Al-Ghazali even 
considers the acquisition of goods for the fulfilment of needs, as a form of worship. 
In this context, wealth, for instance, is needed for the fulfilment of the pilgrimage. 
Consequently, accumulation of capital, according to Al-Ghazali, becomes a form 
of worship.5 In short, Islamic capitalism allows accumulation of capital subject to 
ethical and voluntary self-controls and redistribution of wealth.  
 
Classical Islam developed institutions that were vitally important for capital 
accumulation. To start with, Prophet Muhammad discouraged barter and 
encouraged conducting trade with money. When the Prophet declared that barter 
was a form of usury, he must have catapulted the Arabs from the age of barter to 
the age of money with the result that the demand for money must have increased 
tremendously. Matching this new demand with an equally great supply was made 
possible by military conquest – when Islamic armies swept through the Byzantine 
and Persian domains, they did not hesitate minting Islamic coins out of the hoarded 
precious metals in churches and temples. In this way, the huge increase in the 
demand for money could be matched by an equally dramatic increase in the supply 
                                                 
5 Sabri Orman, Gazali'nin Iktisat Felsefesi (Istanbul: Insan Yayinlari, 2002), p. 79. 
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of money.6 It is well-known that these Islamic coins were found all over Europe. 
The ubiquitousness of the hoards discovered indicates that they had become the 
dominant currency in the period eighth-twelfth centuries, when they re-monetized 
Europe.7  
 
Muslims also developed highly sophisticated partnership and contract laws. These 
laws, the most sophisticated ever throughout the medieval era, were of crucial 
importance for a civilization that applied a stringent prohibition of interest. Thanks 
to these highly advanced contract forms and partnerships, Muslims could combine 
various factors of production despite the interest prohibition. Other financial 
techniques, such as bills of exchange (hawala), checks (saqq) etc., were also in all 
probability developed by the Muslims.8 Moreover, the waqf (pl. awqaf) system 
facilitated private persons to invest in human capital. State investment in human 
capital remained marginal in most Muslim empires. Zekat, a specific tax on certain 
forms of wealth, and awqaf, charitable/philanthropic foundations, were the 
institutions through which Muslims distributed their capital voluntarily. This word 
is written in italics here because voluntary rather than forced redistribution through 
heavy taxation was the norm in classical Islam. Obviously, it was the basic ethical 
teachings of Islam, which effectuated the voluntary nature of income re-
distribution.  
 
It was thanks to this unique and ethical capitalism that the Muslims were able to link 
the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean world-economies a thousand years before 
Western capitalism was able to do so. Moreover, they have successfully maintained 
this linkage for a millennium.9  
 
                                                 
6  Murat Çizakça, “Economic Islamization of Medieval Eurasia: An Institutional Framework”, Library of 
Mediterranean History, Vol. I, No. 1, 1994; Andre Wink, Al-Hind, The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, vol. I 
(Leiden: Brill, 1991): 34-36. 
7    Michael McCormick, The Origins of the European Economy (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), ch. 12. 
8    For the debate whether the European bills of exchange were influenced by the Islamic hawala and suftadja see; 
Eliyahu Ashtor, “Banking Instruments between the Muslim East and the Chritian West”, Journal of European 
Economic History 1(1972): 553-73. 
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In linking the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean world-economies another Islamic 
institution, the pilgrimage played a great role. This institution literally brought 
together millions of Muslims from the four-corners of the world in Mecca. Although 
most Muslims consider the pilgrimage as a purely religious act, in reality it is nearly 
impossible to draw a line between religion and business. First of all, Muslims are 
specifically permitted to trade while involved in the pilgrimage. Second, this duty, 
which is one of the five pillars of Islam, is incumbent upon those Muslims who can 
afford it, that means basically merchants. Thus bulk of the mercantile class of the 
Islamic world is ordered to go to Mecca (and trade there) at least once in a life-time. 
Third, unlike the Christian pilgrimage for which there are a multitude of centres, in 
Islam there is absolutely one centre; Mecca, forcing in fact all the pilgrims to convene 
there. Fourth, throughout history the number of pilgrims was huge. The scattered 
evidence that we have indicates that these numbers fluctuated between 70,000 and 
two millions throughout the history of Islam. It is doubtful, if the much publicised 
European fairs of Champaigne could ever muster such numbers. Moreover, the 
Champaigne fairs were relatively local affairs bringing together mostly Italian and 
Flemish merchants. By contrast Muslims from all continents convene in Mecca. 
Fourth, When pilgrims approach to Mecca, they are ordered to stay and put camp at 
the nearby plains where it is the responsibility of the ruler that free trade and security 
prevail. Any ruler who fails to fulfil these conditions would loose his legitimacy.10 In 
short, the pilgrimage considerably facilitated the establishment of a world-wide trade 
network. The west simply incorporated itself into this system.  
 
Let us now look into another linkage, the one between the two capitalisms. There 
was indeed, significant linkage between western capitalism and its Islamic 
predecessor. This was provided both by institutional borrowing and dissemination 
of ideas. Considering the former, the West borrowed from the Islamic world a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
9 Andre Wink, Al-Hind, The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, vol. I (Leiden: Brill, 1991): 34-36.  




world currency, which helped it to re-monetize its economy, contract law, 
partnership techniques such as profit and loss sharing; combination of the capital of 
a multitude of capitalists and the transfer of this capital to the agent; the shares, 
cash transfer techniques, checks and charitable/philanthropic foundations.11 
Moreover, Daniel Panzac showed that the three most important sources of 
European maritime law, the Rhodian, the Oleron and the Consolato del Mare 
compilations were strongly influenced, even at times directly translated, from the 
eighth-twelfth century Muslim texts.12  
 
Of these, the contract law, partnership techniques and the charitable/philanthropic 
foundations were of particular importance. Contract law constitutes the “golden 
triangle” of New Institutional Economics. This is because, contracts relax the 
constraints of bounded rationality, fix schemes of references for future actions and 
check on opportunistic behaviour.13  Partnership techniques, on the other hand, 
allow the transfer of funds from the capitalist to the entrepreneur, thus combining 
important factors of production, in an interest free environment. Obviously, in view 
of the prevailing interest prohibition everywhere, this was a vitally important 
institution not only for Muslims but also for medieval Europeans. Reference is 
made here of course to the very probable borrowing of the Islamic mudaraba 
contract under the name commenda during the tenth century. The commenda was 
first introduced as a customary practice of the European traders doing trade with 
the Islamic world and then diffused all over Europe through the various 
compilations mentioned above. Later on, during the sixteenth century, we observe 
a synthesis of commenda with a genuine European institution; the corporation. It 
was this synthesis which paved the way to the immensely successful incorporated 
                                                 
11  Murat Çizakça, A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships (Leiden: Brill, 1996) and id., A History of 
Philanthropic Foundations: Islamic World From the Seventh Century to the Present (Istanbul: Bogazici University 
Press, 2000).   
12  Daniel Panzac, “Le Contrat d’Affrement Maritime en Méditerranée: Droit maritime et pratique commerciale entre 
Islam et Chrétiente (XVIIe-XVIIIe Siécles), JESHO, 45, 3, 2002: 355-359. 
13  Claude Ménard, “A New Institutional Approach to Organization”, in C. Ménard and M. Shirley (eds.), Handbook of 
New Institutional Economics (Doordrecht: Springer, 2005), p. 282. 
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joint-stock companies.14  
 
While Islamic origins of commenda are strongly suggested but not yet definitively 
established,15 Islamic origins of the charitable/philanthropic foundations, waqf (pl. 
awqaf), without which, the formation of human capital would have been 
impossible, and Islamic origins of the European maritime law (contract law) are 
now definitively established.16 In short, three Islamic institutions had great impact 
on European capitalism. While the mudaraba/commenda paved the way for the 
incorporated joint-stock companies, the awqaf helped Europe establish, finance 
organize and maintain universities and hospitals, i.e., build human capital, and 
finally the Islamic maritime law enabled European merchant fleets to dominate 
maritime trade between both shores of the Mediterranean.17 Thus, at least from an 
institutional perspective, it can be safely argued that Islamic and medieval 
European capitalisms had by and large the same origins.  
 
Moreover, common origins were not limited to institutions. Ideas of some of the 
greatest medieval Muslim and European philosophers too were quite comparable. 
This is because, they learned from each other. To start with, Al-Ghazali did not 
hesitate to refer to the traditions of Jesus Christ and his consideration of work as a 
form of worship may, at least partially, have been influenced by these Christian 
traditions.18 In return, Al-Ghazali influenced St. Thomas Aquinas, who improving 
upon the custom of his time, acknowledged his debt. Indeed, the influence of Al-
Ghazali’s economic thought on St. Thomas is now so well established that he is 
                                                 
14    For the significance of the corporate form see the various articles by Timur Kuran, particularly his latest; “The 
Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and Persistence”, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 
vol. LIII, Fall 2005, No. 4. 
15    For a summary of this debate see, M. Çizakça, Comparative Evolution, pp. 10-15. 
16    Monica Gaudiosi, “The Influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on the Development of the Trust in England: The 
Case of Merton College", University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 136, no. 4, 1988: 1231-1261; D. Panzac, op. 
cit. 
17 This is because, resorting to the originally Islamic contract forms, European captains had no difficulty in securing 
cargoes belonging to the Muslim merchants. So much so that European vessels eventually came to dominate not 
only the trade between Islamic shores and Europe but also between Islamic ports themselves.  
18 S. M. Ghazanfar, “The Economic Thought of Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali and St. Thomas Aquinas: Some Comparative 
Parallels and Links”, History of Political Economy vol. 32, No.4, 2000: 872. 
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considered to be the forerunner of Aquinas.19 Indeed, Al-Ghazali’s views on just 
price, usury and profits are reflected clearly in Aquinas. One can also argue that 
Al-Ghazali’s views, in comparison to those of Aquinas, were even more liberal. 
Although Al-Ghazali’s influence on St. Thomas is paramount, the latter also 
clearly quoted Avicenna and Averroes as well.20  
 
But even more important than these, the new religions of Europe, Lutheranism and 
Calvinism may have been influenced by Islam. Indeed, some of the most important 
principles of Lutheranism such as the Priesthood of All Believers, Justification 
Through Faith, Primacy of Scripture and Iconoclasm also constitute the primary 
principles of Islam. The possible influence of Islam on Lutheranism and Calvinism is 
supported by the fact that Luther had thoroughly read the Qur'an and had even written 
the preface to the first ever printed version in Europe, the so-called Bibliander Qur'an 
printed in 1543. Finally, Al-Ghazali's concept of work as a form of worship/prayer 
also constitutes the cornerstone of Calvinism.  
 
In addition to these abstract concepts, Islamic civilization (this time, the Ottomans) 
played a significant role in European power politics with vital consequences, which 
still affect our lives today. This took the form of supporting the new Protestant 
nations, England and the Dutch Republic, as well as Catholic France in their struggles 
against the Hapsburgs.21 Although the real significance of this support is not yet fully 
understood, we can make the following observations. Ottomans supported these 
nations out of fear. This was the same fear that the Byzantines had: the re-
establishment of a powerful Western Roman Empire. Indeed, the Byzantine doctrine 
                                                 
19 George Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science, 3 vols. (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1927-48), II: 914; 
id.  Twenty-Seventh Critical Bibliography of the History of Philosophy of Science and the History of Civilization 
(ISIS 13 (March), 1930: 420); S. M. Ghazanfar, “The Economic Thought of Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali and St. Thomas 
Aquinas: Some Comparative Parallels and Links”, History of Political Economy vol. 32, No.4, 2000.  
20 S. M. Ghazanfar, “The Economic Thought…”, p. 864. 
21 Alexander De Groot, The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic, A History of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations, 
1610-1630 (Leiden/Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Arcaelogisch Institut, 1978), H. Waetjen, Die Niederlander im 
Mittelmeergebiet zur Zeit ihrer höchsten Machtstellung (Berlin: 1909), Abhandlungen zur Verkehrs und 
Seegeschichte II; Masson Paul, Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIe siécle (Paris: 1896), Alfred 
C. Wood, A History of the Levant Company (London: 1935); H. Inalcik, “Imtiyazat”, EI2. 
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that “as there is but one God, so there is but one emperor”22 was directly inherited by 
the Ottomans. This is because, as conquerors of Constantinople, Ottoman sultans 
considered themselves as the true Roman emperors. The Conqueror, Mehmed II, 
even took the official title Kayser-i Rum, Caesar of the Romans. Consequently the re-
establishment of a powerful Catholic Western Roman Empire was an anathema for 
the Ottomans. The Ottoman support to France, England and the Netherlands took the 
form of military campaigns on land, which reached to Vienna twice and fleet 
movements in the Western Mediterranean. The Ottoman fleet even spent the winter 
of 1543 in the French port Toulon, fully supported by the King of France, François I. 
It was clear, as François explained to the ambassador of Venice in 1532, that the 
nations of Europe facing the wrath of Charles V, could not survive without Ottoman 
support.23 
 
Ottoman support to the Netherlands appears to have been equally crucial. Throughout 
the decade 1559-68, there was an intimate connection  between Spain`s 
Mediterranean problems and the revolt in Holland. The Dutch nobles were fully 
aware of this situation. They learned from the letters exchanged between the 
ministers of Spain and their colleagues in the Netherlands that Spain`s chief 
preoccupation after 1559 was the Turkish maritime threat. So they concluded: as long 
as the Turks threatened, the (Spanish) king could do nothing in the Netherlands. In 
1565 Orange wrote to his brother: The Turks are very threatening which will mean 
that the king will not come to the Netherlands this summer”. When the sultan 
abandoned the Mediterranean in 1566, indirectly causing Orange`s defeat and exile, 
the Prince sent his own ambassador to the Sultan with the object of securing a 
Turkish campaign in the Mediterranean which would remove Spanish pressure from 
the Netherlands. This  
                                                 
22 D. M. Nicol, “Byzantine Political Thought”, in J. H. Burns (ed.), Medieval Political Thought (Cambridge: CUP, 
1988), p. 52 
23 Halil Inalcik, “Akdeniz ve Türkler”, Dogu-Batı , IX, no. 34, 2005-2006, p. 157. 
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double front war between 1572 and 1576 was a financial nightmare for Spain. Philip 
II spent during these years double his revenues. By 1576 Spain`s unpaid army 
collapsed. This army which numbered 60.000 men on paper had shrinked to a mere 
8000. Spain finally admitted defeat and conceded all the rebels`demands in February 
1577, the Perpetual Edict. Victory according to an ancient Dutch proverb have “come 
from Alkmaar” - it also came from Constantinople.24  
 
May be more important than all this, the support also took the form of opening the 
vast Ottoman markets to the merchants of these nations. In a mercantilist Europe 
where all the borders were rigidly controlled and the imports were limited to the 
absolute minimum, the significance of the vast, open Ottoman markets should not 
escape us. Indeed, as late as the 1660’s 48% of the total exports from London were 
sold in the Mediterranean ports, 43% in all other European ports and only 9% in the 
North American ports.25 Thus for English exporters North American colonies were 
insignificant and the Mediterranean was more important than the whole of the rest of 
Europe combined. Unfortunately we do not know exactly what percentage of the 
Mediterranean bound English goods were actually exported to the Ottoman ports. But 
if we look at the English silk imports from the Mediterranean, Ralph Davis informs 
us that roughly three-fourth of these goods came from the Levant.26 In short, though 
our information is incomplete, it is very probable that Ottoman markets dominated 
the English trade in the late seventeenth century. Moreover, not only were these ports 
open markets but the merchants of these nations were also protected by the 
capitulations granted by the Ottoman sultan. By selling even dumping their goods in 
these ports, English merchants gained access to the silks and spices of the orient 
much demanded in Europe. In short, easily accessed and vast Ottoman markets must 
                                                 
24 Geoffrey Parker, Spain and the Netherlands, 1559-1659 (New Jersey: Enslow, 1979): 28-33. 
25 R. T. Rapp, “The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony”, Journal of Economic History, vol. XXXV, No. 
3, 1975: 502. 
26 Ralph Davis, “English Imports From the Middle East”, in M. A. Cook, Studies in the Economic 
History of the Middle East (Oxford: OUP, 1970), p. 199. During the period 1663-69 silk imports 
totalled 366.000 lbs. Out of this total, 264.000 originated from the Levant and 101.000 from Italy. 
Silk was followed in importance by currants, galls and mohair yarn. Ibid. p. 202. 
 
 12
have played a vital role in the economic development of these nations. Actually, the 
Ottoman markets had political impact as well. This is because, the London merchants 
who accumulated capital at the Ottoman markets used this capital to finance the 
Glorious Revolution. Indeed, the London merchants were the most important 
constituency of the Glorious Revolution.27 
 
It is also necessary to look at these events from the perspective of Eric Jones, the 
author the “European Miracle”. If, as Jones argues, “the European Miracle” was to a 
large extent realized by a multitude of rival, competitive European states opting, 
because of competition, increasingly for liberal policies, then this anti-Hapsburg 
Ottoman policy must have contributed to the European political and economic system 
more significantly then it is normally given credit for. Indeed, had the Ottomans been 
out of the equation and the Habsburgs established and maintained their firm control 
over Germany, the Netherlands, France and England and established a powerful 
absolutist Western neo-Roman Empire, could we still have talked about “the 
European Miracle”? I doubt it, because Europe then would have been a very different 
place than we know it today.  
 
 
This is because, an absolutist neo-Roman empire in the West would not have been 
democratic. In such a Europe, rule of law, the Dutch Financial Revolution and the 
English Glorious and industrial revolutions might never have occurred. Without the 
Glorious Revolution, the other great achievement of the West, the enlightenment, 
might also have never been achieved. Let us indeed not forget that Voltaire was 
profoundly influenced by the post Glorious Revolution England. In short, behind the 
greatest achievements of Europe during the period sixteenth-eighteenth centuries one 
finds a hitherto unrecognized indirect but important Ottoman (Islamic) contribution.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
27 James Macdonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt. 
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At this point we may wonder, if both the philosophy and institutions of western and 
Islamic capitalisms had so much in common, why and when did these civilizations 
diverge from each other so radically. Why indeed did western capitalism flourish 
and the Islamic one stagnated even declined?  
 
Medieval political history of the Middle East may provide a partial answer. During 
the disastrous eleventh-thirteenth centuries Islamic world was hit by two immensely 
powerful enemies; the crusaders from the West and the Mongols from the East. 
Engaged in a fierce struggle for their very survival, this is the period, when the 
Islamic world was unified and completely transformed under the Turkish empires. 
The Turkish domination of the Middle East as well as India that lasted in the Middle 
East for about 900 years has not been sufficiently explained. But most recently, it has 
been argued that these Turkic states practiced a proto-secularism and some form of 
rule of law.28 It was these Central Asian institutions plus the superb military know-
how, also inherited from Central Asia, which enabled these Turkish empires to excel 
above the older Arab empires. These highly centralized and autocratic Turkish 
empires were now able to mobilize massive and well disciplined armies organized 
according to Central Asian traditions to meet the challenge of the crusades head on, 
and even under the Ottomans, roll them back to the gates of Vienna. The pagan 
Mongol invasion, even more horrible than the crusaders, could only be checked by an 
alliance of the Muslim Mamluks and the Anatolian Turcomans.29 While the military 
organization of these Turkish empires and states is well known, we have very little 
information about their economic policies and institutions.30 Such information 
becomes available only with the Ottomans.  
 
                                                 
28 Murat Çizakça, “Cross-cultural Borrowing and Comparative Evolution of Institutions between Islamic World and the 
West”, in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), Relazioni economiche tra Europa ed aree Islamiche, Secc. XIII-XVIII, (Prato: Istituto 
di Storia Economica, F. Datini, Serie II, 38, 2006), forthcoming. The most important Turkic states were the 
Ghaznavids and Mughals in India, the Seljuks and the Mamluks in the Middle East, Safewids in Iran and of course 
later on the Ottomans. 
29  Halil Inalcik, “Osmanlı İmparatorlugu’nda Islam”, in Vecdi Akyüz (ed.), Osmanlı’da Din Devlet İlişkileri (Istanbul: 
Ayışıgı, 1999), s. 95. 
30 W. BARTHOLD, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion, London 19774 (Gibb Memorial Trust), Ch.2; O. TURAN, 
Selçuklular Tarihi ve Türk-Islam Medeniyeti, Istanbul 1993 (Bogazici Yayinlari), p. 376-384. Apparently, while 
 14
These Turkic states/empires that emerged in the Middle East were under the 
influence of several civilizations. They successfully combined Islamic, Central Asian, 
Roman/Byzantine and Sasanid institutions and traditions. The result was absolutism, 
so pronounced that even religion was under the control of the rulers. This age old 
Byzantine tradition already observed at higher levels in pre-Ottoman states reached 
an apogee under the Ottomans. In these Turkic states and particularly in the Ottoman 
Empire, there was no independent Islamic establishment to control the Sultan, no 
independent cities, no feudal parliaments or aristocracy. The Ottoman Sultan was 
omnipotent and there was no separation of powers or democracy.  
 
The reflection of this political system on the economy took the form of what I have 
once called, “the proto-pseudo Ottoman socialism”. “Proto” because it emerged 
centuries before Karl Marx and “pseudo” because it was not based on the theoretical 
premises developed by Marx. But in actual implementation the Ottoman system 
functioned in a similar way to socialism. This system allowed the Ottomans to 
establish harmony among the social classes. They therefore thought that thanks to this 
harmony their state would last forever. But while trying to impede the rise of the 
merchant class above the others, they ended up choking their private enterprise.31 
Equally important, the ideas and vision of the merchants were not reflected on 
economic policy, which continued to be designed by the bureaucrats.32 It is therefore 
not surprising that their system eventually failed when it faced the fiercely 
competitive western capitalism. Two points must be noticed here: 
 
1. Ottoman “proto-pseudo socialism” did not conform to the classical Islamic 
capitalism I have described. It was a unique system invented by the Ottomans 
probably under some Byzantine influence. 
2. The collapse of the Soviet socialism vis a vis western capitalism was not the first 
                                                                                                                                                                  
these empires provided security, they impeded business (S.D. GOITEIN, Studies, cit., p. 351). 
31 For evidence see; Murat Çizakça, Comparative Evolution…, pp. 204-210. The Ottomans called their state “devlet el-
ebed müddet”, the perpetual state. 
32 Sevket Pamuk, Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), p. 10, fn. 35. 
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failure of socialism. The dubious honor of being the first socialism to fail belongs 




Actually, the Ottoman Empire was not the only Islamic empire that collapsed. Other 
Islamic empires in Iran and India had collapsed even before. Thus, within the last two 
centuries, three Islamic empires covering vast territories came to an end, Palestine 
and most recently, Afghanistan and Iraq have also been occupied. In short, the West 
has emerged victorious.  
 
I have tried to show in this paper how the Islamic world had contributed ever since 
the seventh century, directly or indirectly, to the success of the West. Will the 
victorious West now also contribute to the Islamic world? I would say, it should and 
it can.  
 
The West indeed should help to the Islamic world for its own stability and security. 
Because, desperate and cornered, Muslims have started to resort to terrorism and with 
the possibility of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction, we have reached 
at the threshold of a very dangerous era. The world desperately needs long term 
stability and security. 
 
In my opinion two things are absolutely necessary for the Islamic world to recover 
and to start a path towards development and stability: democracy and capitalism. I 
have already shown that Islam had its own system of capitalism, it had a 
Weltanschauung, which was conducive to it. Therefore, capitalism and contemporary 
Islam are certainly compatible. 
 
But democracy is both more important and more difficult to achieve. More important, 
because it is now an established fact that ever since Waterloo (1815), no democratic 
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country has ever fought a war with another democratic country.33 In short, democratic 
countries do not fight wars among each other. It is for this reason that ultimately it is 
the democratization of the Islamic world, which will ensure the security of the West. 
 
But the Iraqis have taught the world a very important lesson, namely that, 
democracy cannot be imposed by outsiders. It must be desired by the Muslims 
themselves. The road to mutual stability and security is therefore clear: much like 
the successful Ottoman help to those nations, which did not wish to be 
overwhelmed by Habsburg absolutism, the West should help those secular Islamic 
countries that do not wish to be subjugated to Islamic fundamentalism and 
genuinely desire a democratic and prosperous future for themselves. Indeed history 
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